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[In 2004, the High Court of Australia had cause to revisit its 1996 decision 
in Kable, as well as to consider the nature of judicial power as it relates to 
the deprivation of liberty, outside of the parameters of conventional criminal 
sentencing. The resulting decisions of Fardon and Baker demonstrate the 
lack of constitutional protections afforded to people who become the focus of 
governmental campaigns to be “tough on crime”. The so-called “Kable 
principle”, as construed by the High Court in 2004, may prove to be the 
“constitutional watch dog that barks but once”.] 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
On 1 October 2004 the High Court of Australia handed down two cases with sig-
nificant implications for civil liberties.  In Baker v The Queen1 the Court was called 
upon to decide the constitutionality of provisions of a NSW Act2 which severely 
restricted the rights of certain prisoners who had been sentenced to life imprison-
ment to obtain a determination of their sentence by way of a fixed minimum term.  
In Fardon v Attorney General for the State of Queensland3 a Queensland prisoner, 
whose release on the expiration of his sentence was denied on the basis that he was 
an ‘unacceptable risk’ of committing a ‘serious sexual offence’, asked the Court to 
declare provisions of a Queensland Act4 which authorised his continued detention 
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1
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1 (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
2
  Sentencing Act, 1989, (NSW.) as amended by Sentencing Legislation Further Amendment Act, 1997, 
(NSW.) 
3
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50 (High Court of Australia, 
2004) 
4
  Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act, 2003, (Qld.) 
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unconstitutional.  In both cases, a six to one majority of the Court (Kirby J dissent-
ing) decided in favour of the validity of the relevant State legislation.   
 
II FACTS 
A Baker v The Queen 
The appellant, Allan Baker, was a New South Wales prisoner who had been sen-
tenced in 1974 along with his co offender5 to a sentence of life imprisonment on 
one count of murder and one count of conspiracy to murder.  At the time of the 
imposition of his sentence, life imprisonment was mandatory on a conviction for 
murder, with no provision for minimum or non parole terms.6  There was, however, 
provision for executive discretion to allow for the supervised release of prisoners, 
including prisoners subject to such mandatory life sentences.7  In sentencing Mr 
Baker and his co offender, the trial judge, Taylor J, remarked, “I believe that you 
should spend the rest of your lives in gaol and there you should die.  If ever there 
was a case where life imprisonment should mean what it says – the imprisonment 
for the whole of your lives – this is it”.8  
 
This remark, which had “no normative legal operation”9 at the time it was uttered in 
1974, was to come back to haunt Mr Baker almost 30 years later when he applied 
for a determination of the sentence passed on him in 1974. 
 
The practice of exercising executive discretion to permit the supervised release of 
prisoners prior to the expiration of their sentence, known vernacularly as “tickets of 
leave”,10 was heavily criticised during the “truth in sentencing”11 debate and was 
abolished in NSW in 1989.12  It was replaced with a system of minimum terms and 
parole orders.  Prisoners who had been sentenced prior to the 1989 reforms could 
apply to the NSW Supreme Court for the determination of their sentence by way of 
a declaration of a minimum non parole term and additional term for sentence.13  Mr 
Baker’s co offender did so successfully apply for a determination of his life sen-
                                                            
5
  Kevin Garry Crump: see below n 14.  
6
  Crimes Act, 1900, s 19 (NSW)  (section now repealed by Crimes (Life Sentences) Amendment Act, 
1989, (NSW) 
7
  Crimes Act, 1900, s 463 (NSW) (section now repealed by Prisons (Serious Offenders Review Board) 
Amendment Act, 1989 (NSW) 
8
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 10 [26] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
9
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 31 [113] (High Court of Australia, 2004) (Kirby J); see also 
Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 32 [114] (High Court of Australia, 2004): “the administrative 
authorities might take a sentencing judge’s ‘recommendation’ into account in performing their functions.  
They might not”. 
10
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 10 [27] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
11
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 6 [10] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
12
  By the Prisons (Serious Offenders Review Board) Amendment Act, 1989, s 5 (NSW.) 
13
  Sentencing Act, 1989, s 13A(2) (NSW.) (now amended by  Sentencing Legislation Further Amend-
ment Act 1997 (NSW.)) 
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tence.14  In response, the NSW Parliament sought to restrict the ability of prisoners 
serving indefinite life sentences to avail themselves of the 1989 reforms and passed  
the Sentencing Legislation Further Amendment Act 1997 (NSW) (“the 1997 NSW 
Act”).  It was the amendments made by the 1997 NSW Act to the Sentencing Act 
1989 (NSW) which were the subject of constitutional challenge by Mr Baker. 
 
Under the amendments introduced by the 1997 NSW Act, “a person who is the 
subject of a non release recommendation” could not apply for a minimum term and 
additional term until, inter alia, they could satisfy the Supreme Court of NSW that 
“special reasons exist that justify making the determination”.15 
 
The 1997 NSW Act came into force on 9 May 1997.  On 1 August 1997 Mr Baker 
applied to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for an order determining the 
minimum and additional terms of his life sentence.  It was common ground between 
the parties that the remarks of Taylor J on sentencing Mr Baker in 1974 constituted 
a “non release recommendation” for the purposes of the 1997 NSW Act.16  There-
fore, Mr Baker had to demonstrate that “special reasons existed” before he could 
apply for a minimum term, effectively his only hope for eventual release.   
 
Despite the unchallenged evidence that since his incarceration at age 2517 Mr Baker 
had developed into an “exemplary’ prisoner”18 who presented as a “very good” 
prospect for rehabilitation,19 both the judge at first instance,20 and the Court of 
Criminal Appeal,21 determined that he had not made out the existence of “special 
reasons” and was therefore ineligible for a determination of his life sentence.  
 
 
B Fardon v Attorney General for the State of Queensland  
 
In 2003 the Queensland Parliament passed the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Of-
fenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (“the Queensland Act”).  It conferred upon the Queensland 
Supreme Court the power to “provide for the continued detention in custody or 
supervised release of a particular class of prisoner to ensure adequate protection of 
the community”22 and provided for the Attorney General to apply to the Queensland 
Supreme Court for the continued detention of prisoners who were nearing the end 
                                                            
14
  Application of Kevin Garry Crump (Unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, McInerney J, 24 April 
1997). 
15
  Sentencing Act, 1989, s 13A(3A) (NSW.) as amended by Sentencing Legislation Further Amendment 
Act, 1997, Sch 1, item 2  (NSW.) 
16
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 10 [26] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
17
  Mr. Baker was arrested on 13 November 1973 aged 25 and has remained in custody since his arrest: 
Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 10 [25] (Gleeson CJ) (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
18
  R v. Baker, [2001] NSWSC 412 [109] (G R James J) ( Supreme Court of New South Wales, 2001) 
19
  R v. Baker, [2001] NSWSC 412 [122] ( Supreme Court of New South Wales, 2001) 
20
  R v. Baker, [2001] NSWSC 412 (G R James J) ( Supreme Court of New South Wales, 2001) 
21
  R v. Baker, (2002) 130 A Crim R 417 (New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 2002) 
22
  Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act, 2003, s 3, 8 (Qld.) 
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of their original sentence of imprisonment.23  To fall under the purview of the 
Queensland Act the prisoner had to be serving a sentence with respect to a “serious 
sexual offence”,24 defined in the Schedule to the Queensland Act as an “offence of a 
sexual nature involving violence or against children”. 
 
One such prisoner was Robert John Fardon.  Mr Fardon had been convicted on 30 
June 1989 of offences of rape, sodomy and assault occasioning actual bodily harm 
for which he was sentenced to 14 years jail.  Mr Fardon was due to be released on 
or about 30 June 2003.  The Queensland Act came into force on 6 June 2003.   
 
Prior to Mr Fardon’s scheduled release, under the terms of the Queensland Act, the 
Attorney General initially applied for an interim detention order25 which was 
granted on 27 June 2003.  The Attorney General ultimately applied for a final 
‘indefinite detention’ order which was granted on 6 November 2003.26 Mr Fardon 
was therefore never released, even though he had served out his sentence. 
 
III THE KABLE PRINCIPLE & ITS APPLICATION IN 
FARDON AND BAKER 
Both Mr Baker and Mr Fardon sought to invoke the ‘Kable principle’ to invalidate 
the relevant provisions of the NSW Act and the Queensland Act respectively.   
 
The High Court’s 1996 decision in Kable v DPP (NSW)27 determined that where a 
state legislature sought to confer powers upon a state court which was vested with 
Commonwealth jurisdiction pursuant to Chapter III of the Constitution, that state 
legislature could not confer those powers if they would have the effect of compro-
mising the integrity of the judicial system brought into existence by Chapter III of 
the Constitution by being  “repugnant to or incompatible with”28 the exercise of 
federal judicial power.  As put by one of the justices in the majority in Kable: 
 
While nothing in Chapter III prevents a State from conferring non-judicial 
functions on a State Supreme Court in respect of non-federal matters, those 
non-judicial functions cannot be of a nature that might lead an ordinary 
reasonable member of the public to conclude that the Court was not inde-
pendent of the executive government of the State.29 
 
                                                            
23
  Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act, 2003, s 8 (Qld.) (re an ‘interim detention order’) and 
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act, 2003, s 13 (Qld.) (re a ‘continuing detention order’) 
24
 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act, 2003, s 5(6) (Qld.)  
25
 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act, 2003, s 8 (Qld.) 
26
 Attorney General for the State of Queensland v. Fardon, [2003] QSC 379 (Supreme Court of Queen-
sland, 2003) 
27
 Kable v. DPP (NSW), (1996) 189 CLR 51 (High Court of Australia, 1996) 
28
 Kable v.  DPP (NSW), (1996) 189 CLR 51, 103 (Gaudron J) (High Court of Australia, 1996); see also 
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v. Attorney General (NSW.), (2000) 158 FLR 81, 88 (Spegelman J)  
29
 Kable v. DPP (NSW), (1996) 189 CLR 51, 117 (McHugh J) (High Court of Australia, 1996) 
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The principle propounded in Kable represented a significant departure from the 
Court’s previous approach that “the Commonwealth must take State Courts as it 
finds them”.30  In its immediate aftermath, Kable was identified by some commen-
tators as a portal through which certain civil libertarian rights, for example a protec-
tion against retrospective punishment, could be protected under our present 
Constitution.31  In the more sombre light cast by Fardon and Baker, it appears now 
that those hopes were misplaced.  As put by Kirby J in his dissenting judgement in 
Baker, Kable has so far proven to be the constitutional guard-dog that has barked 
but once.32  
 
A Baker & the Kable Principle  
Mr Baker sought to invoke the Kable principle by arguing that the requirement of 
“special reasons” imposed on him by the 1997 NSW Act as a precondition for 
eligibility to apply for a determination of his life sentence was so “devoid of content 
and illusory”33 that it was not a proper condition for the exercise of judicial power.  
His argument was roundly rejected by all the justices of the Court save Kirby J.  In 
their joint majority judgement, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ refer to 
numerous examples where judicial power is validly exercised by reference to “im-
precisely expressed criteria”, akin to the qualification of “special reasons” found in 
the 1997 NSW Act.34  In conclusion, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ 
expressly state that: 
 
[i]f the provisions of the [1997 NSW Act] under challenge had been laws 
of the Commonwealth, they would have complied with the principles 
found in Chapter III of the Constitution for the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion by federal courts and by state courts invested pursuant to a law made 
under s 77(iii) of the Constitution.35 
 
Thus, Mr Baker failed the first hurdle of Kable invalidity as propounded in the 1998 
decision of the Court in H A Bachrach Pty Ltd v Queensland36: “[I]f the law in 
question …had been a law of the Commonwealth and it would not offend have 
offended [the principle propounded in Kable], then an occasion for the application 
of Kable does not arise”.37  
 
                                                            
30
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 63 [38] (McHugh J) 
(High Court of Australia, 2004) 
31
  See, e.g. Mirko Bagaric & Tanya Lakic, Victorian Sentencing Turns Retrospective: The Constitutional 
Validity of Retrospective Criminal Legislation after Kable, 23 CRIMINAL L. J. 145, 154-8 (1999); James 
Miller, Criminal Cases in the High Court of Australia, 21 CRIMINAL L.  J. 92, 99-103 (1997) 
32
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1,17 [54] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
33
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 6 [11] (Gleeson CJ) (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
34
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1,14 [42] (High Court of Australia, 2004); see also, Baker v. 
The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 7 [13] (Gleeson CJ) (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
35
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 9-10 [24] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
36
  H A Bachrach Pty Ltd v. Queensland, (1998) 195 CLR 547 (High Court of Australia, 1998) 
37
  H A Bachrach Pty Ltd v. Queensland, (1998) 195 CLR 547, 562 (High Court of Australia, 1998). 
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The other two majority justices, Gleeson CJ and Callinan J, whilst adopting similar 
reasoning to the joint majority judgement, reduce Mr Baker’s argument to a neces-
sary assertion that the determination of special reasons under the 1997 NSW Act 
must be impossible to fulfil and therefore a “charade”38 or “a futility”39 for the 1997 
NSW Act to attract the possible operation of the Kable principle.  They conclude 
that “[t]here is real content”40 in the criteria of “special reasons” contained in the 
1997 NSW Act. 
 
B Fardon & the Kable principle 
The majority justices, Callinan and Heydon JJ in a joint judgement and Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and McHugh JJ in separate judgements, all find that there are substantial 
differences between the provisions of the Queensland Act and the legislation which 
was invalidated in Kable.  In traversing the scheme established by the Queensland 
Act, they place particular emphasis on its provisions for the application of the laws 
of evidence and an adversarial system, with an onus upon the Attorney General to 
establish “by acceptable, cogent evidence to a high degree of probability”41 that the 
prisoner is a “serious danger to the community”.42  The virtue of these provisions 
contrasts with the vice of the legislation invalidated in Kable.  Thus:  
 
[n]othing in the [Queensland] Act gives any ground for concluding that it 
impairs the institutional capacity of the Supreme Court to exercise federal 
jurisdiction….[n]othing in the [Queensland] Act might lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that the Supreme Court of Queensland, when exercis-
ing federal jurisdiction, might not be an impartial tribunal free of govern-
mental or legislative influence or might not be capable of administering 
invested federal jurisdiction according to law.43   
 
Of all the majority judgements, the joint judgement of Callinan and Heydon JJ 
provides the most sweeping endorsement of the contested provisions of the Queen-
sland Act.  Their Honours characterise the Queensland Act as “protective” of the 
community rather than “punitive”44and conclude that the Act bears “the hallmarks 
of traditional judicial forms and procedure”.45  They maintain that the predictive 
                                                            
38
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 6 [11], 9 [19] (Gleeson CJ) (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
39
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 49 [177] (Callinan J) (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
40
  Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 49 [177] (Callinan J) (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
41
 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act, 2003, s 13(3) (Qld.); see also s 30(2)(b) re ‘annual 
reviews’.  
42
  Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act, 2003, s 13(1) (Qld.) 
43
 Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 62 [35] (McHugh J) 
(High Court of Australia, 2004) 
44
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 109 [216], 110 [219] cf 
Hayne J who opines that ‘no sharp line can be drawn between…detention that is punitive and detention 
that is not’ (Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 103 [195] 
(High Court of Australia, 2004)); see also Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, 
(2004) 210 ALR 50, 74 [82] (Gummow J) (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
45
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 110 [220] (High Court 
of Australia, 2004) 
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process involved in the decision whether or not to make a preventive detention 
order is not, in itself, foreign to the judicial process: it is relevant to the legitimate 
sentencing objective of protection of the community46 as well as akin to such estab-
lished exercises of judicial power as an assessment of damages for future 
losses.47Although they caution that the Court should be “vigilant in ensuring that 
the occasions for non-punitive detention are not abused or extended for illegitimate 
purposes”,48 they do not make it clear exactly what might constitute “illegitimate 
purposes”, nor on what constitutional basis such forms of “non- punitive” detention 
could be invalidated. 
 
During the course of the Fardon litigation, the Commonwealth Attorney General 
successfully sought leave to intervene to argue, pursuant to the Court’s 1998 deci-
sion in Bachrach,49 that, even if the Commonwealth had passed legislation compa-
rable to the Queensland Act, it would not be invalid as offending Chapter III of the 
Constitution.  Gummow J is the only majority justice who expressly rejects this 
submission.50  He does so on the basis that the powers conferred by the Queensland 
Act do not flow from the sentencing process, and that powers of involuntary deten-
tion of citizens conferred by the Commonwealth Parliament to Chapter III courts 
are only valid “ ‘exceptional cases’ aside…as a consequential step in the adjudica-
tion of criminal guilt of that citizen for past acts”.51 
 
Gummow J observes that the notion of repugnancy expounded in Kable is “insus-
ceptible of further definition in terms which necessarily dictate future outcomes”.52 
He finds that the Queensland Act is not repugnant in the Kable sense because it 
does not confer on the Queensland Supreme Court functions which are closely 
connected with the legislature or executive of Queensland.   He finds that the proc-
esses provided for in the Queensland Act “ameliorate what otherwise would be the 
sapping of the institutional integrity of the [Queensland] Supreme Court”53: the 
Queensland Act utilises a legitimate factum for its operation, that factum being 
connected with an anterior finding of criminal guilt “by the usual judicial process” 
with respect to a serious sexual offence,54 and adopts a judicial process in its opera-
                                                            
46
  See, e.g. Veen v. The Queen [No 2], (1988) 164 CLR 465 (High Court of Australia, 1988) 
47
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 112 [226] (High Court 
of Australia, 2004) 
48
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 109 [217] (High Court 
of Australia, 2004) 
49
  H A Bachrach Pty Ltd v. Queensland, (1998) 195 CLR 547 (High Court of Australia, 1998) 
50
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 71 [69] (High Court of 
Australia, 2004) 
51
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 74 [80] (High Court of 
Australia, 2004) 
52
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 79 [104] (High Court of 
Australia, 2004) 
53
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 76 [90] (High Court of 
Australia, 2004) 
54
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 80 [108] (High Court of 
Australia, 2004) 
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tions, including an annual review of any extant order.55  Significantly, he does warn  
that “a legislative choice of a factum of some other character may well have imper-
illed the validity of section 13 [of the Queensland Act]”.56  
 
C The Dissenting Judgements Of Kirby J 
Kirby J’s lengthy dissenting judgements may be reduced to three central proposi-
tions: (i) that the Kable principle must be interpreted expansively (i.e. there is only 
a “limited field of difference” between Federal Courts and State Courts;57 (ii) that 
the Kable principle must be interpreted consonant with ‘traditional’ notions of 
judicial power; and (iii) that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation 
by reference to the Kable principle, one must refer to the substance of the legisla-
tion rather than its form. 
 
1 Kirby J in Fardon 
Kirby J contends that the Queensland Act satisfies the Kable test for repugnancy 
because it provides for a form for civil commitment that is unknown to the law.  He 
is not persuaded by the semblance of the Queensland Act which expressly posits the 
object of protection of the community, and instead looks at the substance of the 
orders provided for in the Act as being punitive in nature.  Therefore, they offend 
against common law principles of double jeopardy and retrospective punishment.58  
He also argues that, although the legislation is not expressly ad hominem, it is 
highly selective in its application, which makes it “inconsistent with the traditional 
judicial process”.59 
 
2 Kirby J in Baker 
Kirby J argues that once stripped of its semblance of orthodox judicial process, the 
NSW Act is clearly in substance ad hominem legislation that is directed at a tiny 
and specific class of approximately ten New South Wales prisoners remaining in 
the New South Wales prison system, who were subject to indeterminate life sen-
tences passed prior to the 1989 reforms.  In making this argument, he is assisted by 
some of the predictable rhetoric of the New South Wales politicians who debated 
                                                            
55
  Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 80-1 [110]-[113] (High 
Court of Australia, 2004) 
56
 Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 80 [108] (High Court of 
Australia, 2004) 
57
 Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 88 [144] (High Court of 
Australia, 2004) 
58
 And are also ‘contrary to the obligations assumed by Australia under the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights’: Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004)210 ALR 50, 
101 [185] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
59
 Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 98 [176] (High Court of 
Australia, 2004) 
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the legislation.60 Most tellingly, he highlights the dubious nature of the NSW Act in 
his critique of the so called “non release recommendation,” which affords the fac-
tum for the restriction on Mr Baker’s eligibility to apply for a determination of his 
life sentence.61  As he notes, remarks, such as those made by Taylor J in 1974, were 
entirely arbitrary and subject to the idiosyncrasies of the individual judge.62    
 
IV CONCLUSION AND COMMENTARY 
 
In commenting on the Court’s decisions in Fardon and Baker it is apposite to recall 
the Red Queen’s admonition to Alice in Through the Looking Glass that “it takes all 
the running you can do to keep in the same place”.  For what is being authorised by 
the “conservative” majorities in their ostensible adherence to Constitutional literal-
ism (by their timorous refusal to “run” at all with an expansive and generous inter-
pretation of the Kable principle) is in fact radical new forms of detention, whether 
they be indeterminate life sentences with no prospect of release (Baker) or indefi-
nite detention post the serving of a sentence with annual judicial review of that 
detention (Fardon), practices which were hitherto largely foreign to our legal sys-
tem.63  Gleeson CJ is quite correct when he observes that “[c]ourts do not operate in 
a politically sterile environment.  They administer the law, and much law is the 
outcome of political action”.64  However, in the absence of other protections, such 
as might be enshrined in a Bill of Rights, it is precisely in response to changes in 
the way governments choose to exercise power over their citizens that the High 
Court must be prepared to ‘run’ with principles such as that propounded in Kable if 
Australia is not to become a very different place from the nation it has been in the 
first hundred years since Federation.  Thus it is Kirby J (commonly and mistakenly 
identified as a ‘radical’ judge by conservative commentators) who fights dissen-
tiously for legal conservation, i.e. the preservation of traditional modes of the exer-
cise of judicial power and the robust independence of the judiciary from the fervid 
aspirations of the various Houses of Parliaments.65   
 
                                                            
60
 ‘Proposing legislation that is constitutionally sound is the Government’s primary objective so as not to 
give Crump and these nine other animals [i.e. including Mr Baker – see above, n 14] any hope for the 
future’: the NSW Minister for Police, quote extracted in Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 19-20 
[64] (Kirby J) (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
61
 Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 31-3 [112]-[119] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
62
 Indeed, there was some judicial authority discouraging judges from making such emotive remarks on 
sentence: Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 32 [115] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
63
 Cf. Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 75 [83] (Gummow J) 
(High Court of Australia, 2004) 
64
 Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 57 [21] (High Court of 
Australia, 2004) 
65
 See, e.g. the extracts from the NSW Parliamentary Debates in Baker v. The Queen, (2004) 210 ALR 1, 
18-20 [59]-[66], 45 [165] (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
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In interpreting the predicament of Mr Fardon one is reminded of the insights of 
Michel Foucault.66  The finality of a one-off judicial sentence made with respect to 
past criminal guilt, an immaculate articulation of centralised “monarchical” or 
“classical” power,67 has been supplanted in Mr Fardon’s case by a flexible “dif-
fused” detention regime which relies on the predictions of a cabal of the usual 
suspects - psychiatrists and social workers - as to the likelihood of his recidivism.  
In a more florid, Foucaudian moment, one might even describe the latter as a nas-
cent exercise in judicial “bio power”.68  Given the commonly expressed reserva-
tions as to the accuracy of professional predications of recidivism and danger,69 one 
senses that Mr Fardon’s fictitious crime (as opposed to his real crime for which he 
has already “done his time”) is his “failure ... to participate to completion in 
…courses of therapy … [h]e has for the most part, chosen not to take some respon-
sibility for his own rehabilitation and engage in appropriate treatment”.70  He has 
therefore failed to display all the (post) modern indicia of remorse.71  Like Meur-
sault, the antihero of Camus’ Outsider, Mr Fardon is being punished not for what he 
has done, but his public refusal to adopt social norms or expectations of how an 
offender should behave in the face of his crimes. 
 
It is difficult to argue against the logic of the system of “indefinite detention” con-
doned by the majority in Fardon; indeed it would be extraordinary if the system 
which was so closely aligned with the implementation of state power did not have 
an almost irresistible logic.  Given that risk of recidivism is a relevant factor at the 
time of sentence under the rubric of the legitimate sentencing objective of protec-
tion of the community, surely it makes sense to consider the risk of recidivism at 
the time of prospect release, as such assessments (notoriously unreliable as they 
                                                            
66
 A philosopher now so securely part of the mainstream that he is cited in High Court judgements. See 
Fardon v. Attorney General for the State of Queensland, (2004) 210 ALR 50, 70 [63] (Gummow J) 
(High Court of Australia, 2004) 
67
 For a discussion of Foucault’s theories on this mode of power see ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, 
FOUCAULT AND LAW 43-6 (1996).  
68
 See, e.g.  I MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 135-45 (1978): ‘the judicial institution is 
increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose 
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are72) are likely to be more accurate at this later stage?  Similarly, it is difficult to 
argue against the notion of “flexibility” in detention: after all, “flexibility” is one of 
the mantras of our restructured, globalised economy/society.  Why should we not 
replace the anachronistic practice of “once and for all” sentencing with a more 
modern flexible approach of indefinite detention, judicially “managed” by way of 
annualised review?  Whilst such seductive and modish arguments conveniently 
ignore the gross inadequacies of supports for offenders both with and outside of 
prison (and leave uncriticised the normative judgments of those who provide those 
supports), their latent vice is their exposure of the most abject members of our 
community – sex offenders, murderers and their like [“animals” in the words of the 
Honourable NSW State Minister for Police (Labor)73] - to arbitrary, wilful and 
inhumane treatment.   
 
What then of Mr Baker, one member of the NSW Minister’s class of “animals”?  In 
1989 Mr Baker became the beneficiary of one of the few palatable fruits that has 
fallen from the poison tree of the perennial “Tough on Crime/Law & Order” putsch, 
that of the replacement of the old “tickets of leave” system, replete with all its 
opaque, Byzantine uncertainties, with the rational, transparent, juridical process of 
minimum sentences and parole orders.  That right to seek a determination of his 
sentence was effectively taken away from him in 1997.  It is deeply disturbing that 
it was done so by reference to a legally superfluous comment from a sentencing 
judge in 1974, a fundamentally flawed foundational “factum” upon which to erect a 
legal apparatus designed to thwart a prospect of liberty.  In addition to the violation 
of rights which Mr Baker would have in many other civilised jurisdictions around 
the world,74 he has, in effect, retroactively been denied natural justice and proce-
dural fairness.  At the time of his sentencing, there would have been no purpose in 
making a plea in mitigation, given that he was facing a mandatory sentencing 
regime.  One can reasonably speculate that he would have had no notice that Taylor 
J was about to make the remark that he did, nor would he have had the opportunity 
prior to the making of it to provide material to the court which may have persuaded 
Taylor J to temper his remark, or indeed to refrain from making it.75   
 
Putting to one side the dissents of Kirby J, only Gummow J’s judgement in Fardon 
provides any succour to those of us concerned about our vulnerability to state 
sponsored incursions upon our civil liberties under our current constitutional ar-
rangements. Gummow J’s preparedness to contemplate the invalidation of Com-
monwealth legislation, which purports to authorise involuntary detention 
disconnected from the adjudication of criminal guilt, may be useful (if picked up by 
other justices) in the struggle against the predicable domestic and imported excesses 
of the “war on terror”, given that much of the legislation bellicosely passed in the 
name of that nominal war has been, and will continue to be, Commonwealth legis-
lation. Our best aspirations for the decisions of Fardon and Baker may be their 
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unintentional reinvigoration of the campaign for the formal adoption of a Bill of 
Rights; such a Bill of Rights could provide recourse for our citizens, such as Mr 
Fardon and Mr Baker, who are subject to the persecutorial whims of our various 
governments in their insatiable quest (to be seen) to be “tough on crime”.  
 
 
